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Abstract
It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an inde-
pendent central bank, which acts as an agent for the government, does
not mitigate the problem of time-inconsistency, but merely relocates
it. We argue here that this is not so, and that delegation enables a
wider class of economies to sustain zero in‡ation than would be able
to do so in its absence. We consider an economy in which the govern-
ment faces re-appointment costs, that is, costs associated with sacking
one central banker and replacing them with another, costs which are
intended to protect central bank independence. We show that, by
means of suitable announcements of incentive schemes for the central
bank, combined with appropriate actually implemented schemes, del-
egated policy enables zero in‡ation to prevail in economies in which
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it could not do so without delegated policy. These economies are ones
that have relatively high discount rates (and so low discount factors).
JEL Classi…cation numbers: E31; E58; E61
Keywords: credibility, delegation, time-inconsistency, independent
central banks, monetary policy
1 Introduction
The monetary delegation approach to solving potential time-inconsistency
problems has recently been questioned byMcCallum (1995, 1997). He argues
that, as there is always the temptation for the government to renege on
the chosen monetary institution, the institutional remedies proposed in this
approach do not …x the problem of time inconsistency. They merely relocate
it.1’2
Persson and Tabellini (1999), amongst others, have replied to this criti-
cism by observing that: “in the model that dominates the literature, what
is needed is a high cost for changing the institution within the time hori-
zon of existing nominal contracts” and “the cost of suddenly changing the
institution could also be a loss of reputation”.
1Posen (1995) also criticises the delegation approach and provides some empirical …nd-
ings that, in contrast to the previous empirical evidence, suggest that the relationship
between central bank independence and disin‡ationary credibility is not supported. He
concludes that central bank independence alone is not su¢cient. The presence of a coali-
tion in society committed to protecting the central bank independence is necessary for
achieving low in‡ation. In particular he concludes that, as the …nancial community is the
critical constituency that in‡uences the central bank, the outcomes of monetary policy
will predominantly re‡ect that of the monetary policy desired by the …nancial community.
However, no formal analysis is presented and as shown by Alesina (1995) his empirical
…ndings are controversial.
2McCallum refers his criticism only to the Walsh contracting approach. Also Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1996) make the same criticism referring to the Walsh solution. There is the
view that the Rogo¤’s approach is immune to McCallum’s criticism. In that regard Alesina
(1995, p.289) wrote: ’it is institutionally harder to dismiss a ”conservative” central banker
than it is for the policymaker simply to renege on a policy announcement made without the
independent conservative agent’. However in his argument there is the implicit assumption
that the presence of reappointment costs will deter the government from over-ruling the
banker or sacking him and appointing a less conservative one. If, following Jensen (1997),
we interpret the principal-agent approach as a complex institutional arrangement based
on a structure of incentives that is costly to change, then Alesina’s argument should hold
also for the Walsh approach.
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This premise, which has been implicitly assumed in the standard lit-
erature on delegation, has been recently challenged by Jensen (1997). He
explicitly introduces the delegation stage in the government policy choice
and adds a quadratic cost for reappointments. In the static one-shot game
version higher costs of reappointment reduce the in‡ationary bias but never
remove it. An exception is represented only by the extreme and unrealistic
case where the weight on reappointment costs in the government’s loss func-
tion is in…nite. In this situation optimal monetary delegation is not subject
to a credibility problem, but all that matters in the loss function are reap-
pointment costs. Moreover if the game is repeated over an in…nite horizon,
along the lines of Barro and Gordon (1983), the presence of reappointment
costs worsens the credibility of optimal monetary policy under delegation
compared to the case when monetary policy is conducted directly by the
government.
These results imply a negative view of the contracting solution and in
general of the monetary delegation approach. Jensen concludes by suggest-
ing that too much emphasis has been given to the approach of monetary
delegation and that research should focus on other directions, in particular
on the relationships between time inconsistency and structural policies.
In the present analysis we show that the paradoxical result, that reap-
pointment costs worsen the credibility of optimally delegated monetary pol-
icy, results from an implicit limitation on the range of policies that are con-
sidered. The analysis has restricted the set of announced incentive schemes
(or contracts) that the government might present to the central bank to
maintain zero in‡ation. When this restriction is removed, the opposite, less
paradoxical result is restored, namely that costs of reappointing the central
banker do in fact enable zero in‡ation to emerge from a credible policy in
circumstances (i.e., when the government is su¢ciently impatient) in which
it would not do so in the absence of such costs. On this basis we are able to
assert that delegation does not merely relocate the time inconsistency prob-
lem. Rather it does more than this. In some circumstances it does indeed
provide a solution to it.
2 The model
We use the same notation as Jensen (1997). The supply function is given by
the standard expectations-augmented Phillips curve
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yt = ® (¼t ¡ ¼et) ; (1)
where for simplicity the natural level of output is normalised to zero;
¼t,¼et are the actual and expected in‡ation rate respectively.
The government’s loss function is expressed by
~Lt =
h
¼2t + ¸ (yt ¡ y)2 + ' (ft ¡ fat )2
i
; (2)
where deviations of output and in‡ation from the targets are weighted by 1
and ¸ respectively, with ¸ > 0: As usual in the time inconsistency literature
the output target is assumed to be greater than the natural level, y > 0.
But in contrast with the previous literature on monetary delegation, there is
now an additional cost on the reappointment of the central banker, expressed
by the di¤erence between the announced incentive scheme with the penalty
fat and the realised scheme with incentive ft. In particular if ft 6= fat we
will say that the central banker has been reappointed, which in the present
framework will happen at some cost to the government. The parameter '
re‡ects the distaste for reappointment costs relative to the other costs in the
loss function. When monetary policy is delegated we have ' > 0. When
there is no delegation ' is set equal to zero. As observed by Jensen, if
ft and fat are understood not simply as the contract o¤ered to the central
banker, but as referring to a complex system of monetary regulations, it
seems natural to assume that a small change is less costly than a bigger
one. This may justify the use of a quadratic cost of reappointments with an
assigned weight ':3
Monetary policy is delegated by the government to a central banker whose
loss function is the following
Lbt =
h
¼2t + ¸ (yt ¡ y)2 + 2ft¼t
i
: (3)
Here the central banker is …ned with the penalty 2ft for in‡ation rates
greater than zero. As we will see later on, the optimal incentive scheme that
allows the government to eliminate the in‡ation bias is ft = ¸®y.
3An alternative way of modelling reappointment costs would be to assume that if the
government reneges on his announcement it will also incur a …xed cost and that this
…xed component is relatively more important than that dependent on the size of the
modi…cations of the given institutional arrangement. This idea is captured, for example,
in the work of Lohmann (1992).
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In each period the timing of moves is the following. In stage zero, the
government delegates monetary policy to a central banker and announces an
incentive scheme fat . In stage 1, the private sector forms expectations about
in‡ation and sets wages. In stage 2, the government sets actual conditions
ft for monetary policy. Finally, in stage 3, the CB sets actual in‡ation.
In the discretionary regime the central banker minimises the discounted
value of his loss function,
P1
¿¡t ¯
¿¡tLbt, subject to (1) by taking in‡ation
expectations and actual conditions for monetary policy ft as given. The
parameter 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor of the central banker. It is
assumed that the central banker and the government have the same discount
factor.
From the …rst order condition we obtain the central banker’s reaction
function
¼t =
¸®2¼et + ¸®y ¡ ft
¤
; (4)
where ¤ = (1 + ¸®2).When choosing actual monetary conditions for mon-
etary policy, the government must take its prior announcements and in‡ation
expectations as given but incorporates the behaviour of the central banker in
it’s decision problem. Thus it minimises the discounted value of its loss func-
tion,
P1
s¡t ¯
s¡tLs, with respect to ft subject to (1) and (4). The minimisation
yields the following optimal incentive scheme
ft =
'¤
1 + '¤
fat ; (5)
where fat is the announcement chosen by government. As observed by
Jensen the assumption of prohibitive costs of reappointment when monetary
policy is delegated by the government to a central banker eliminates by def-
inition the issue of the credibility of optimal monetary delegation. From (5)
one can see that announcements will always be ful…lled if the government’s
only concern is reappointment costs, i.e. when '! +1.
The private sector’s in‡ation expectations are obtained by substituting
(5) into (4). After taking expectations we get
¼e;NCDt = ¸®y ¡
'¤
1 + '¤
fat : (6)
Finally the government chooses the optimal announcement. When mak-
ing this choice the government internalises the e¤ects of its decision on the
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central banker’s behaviour, on its own behaviour when choosing actual mon-
etary conditions, and on the private sector’s expectations, Minimising the
government’s loss function with respect to fat subject to (4), (5) and (6)
yields
fa;NCDt =
¤(1 + '¤)¸®y
1 + '¤2
: (7)
Expression (7) implies that
fNCDt =
'¤2¸®y
1 + '¤2
: (8)
Here we can observe that if ' tends to in…nite we have fa;NCDt = ¸®y
and fNCDt = f
a;NCD
t . Thus, if reappointment costs are prohibitive, in the
static one-shot game version of Jensen’s model optimal monetary delegation
is not subject to a credibility problem. However, the more realistic case is
when these costs are not all that matters in the government’s loss function,
or in other words when in expression (2) the weight ' is not in…nite.
The equilibrium in‡ation rate will be under the discretionary regime with
delegation
¼NCDt =
¸®y
1 + '¤2
: (9)
If the government does not delegate monetary policy, i.e. ' = 0, it
is straightforward to show that if the government behaves in a discretionary
manner the equilibrium in‡ation rate would be ¼NCt = ¸®y. From expression
(9) we can see that delegation reduces the in‡ation bias but does not remove
it. On the contrary if the government could idealistically precommit to an
announced policy rule before expectations are formed then the government
would not need to delegate monetary policy in order to eliminate the in‡ation
bias and the optimal policy rule, or the precommitment policy rule, would
be in this deterministic case to set ¼PRt = 0. Comparing the government’s
losses under the equilibrium with precommitment and the equilibrium with
discretion it is possible to see that in the case of delegation the loss is lower
than in the case when the government conducts monetary policy directly and
behaves in a discretionary manner, but is greater than in the precommiment
equilibrium.
In the subsequent sections we will consider the situation when the policy
game is repeated for an in…nite number of periods in order to study the
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precommitment technology where the private sector punishes deviations by
a one-period reversion to expectations given by the discretionary solution.
3 Jensen’s paradox
Let us examine the situation when repeated interactions among the players
take place. In particular assume that the game is repeated for an in…nite
number of periods. In this case Barro and Gordon (1983) have shown that,
if the private sector adopts a punishment strategy triggered by any observed
deviation from optimal policy and if the government does not discount the
future too heavily, it is possible that the future cost to the government of
loss of reputation may more than outweigh the current gain from deviation.4
By assuming that the private sector reverts for one period to the dis-
cretionary solution whenever a deviation from optimal policy is observed,
Jensen has found that the minimal requirement for the patience of the gov-
ernment is given by ¯ ¸ b¯ ´ 1=¤. If the discount factor, ¯, is su¢ciently
high optimal monetary policy is a perfect Nash equilibrium and therefore it
is also credible. Alternatively if the discount factor is not su¢ciently high,
optimal monetary policy is not credible. In order to achieve the precommit-
ment solution the government might consider delegating monetary policy to
a central banker with the optimal incentive scheme ft = ¸®y and try again
to maintain a reputation for low in‡ation. Also in this case the credibility of
optimal monetary delegation, where credibility is understood as the ability
to carry out optimal monetary policy, can be studied by examining simple
punishment strategies based on a one-period reversion to the discretionary
solution.5 Consider the following strategy combinations:
4This framwork – a reputational model with trigger strategies – su¤ers from various
well-known weaknesses, prominent among them the multiplicity of solutions. Backus
and Dri¢ll (1985), among many others, have commented on the problems inherent in the
game-theoretic framework used by Barro and Gordon (1983), on which Jensen’s analysis is
based. Other formulations of the model, such as those of Herrendorf (1998) and al-Nowaihi
and Levine (1996), who also examine the credibility of optimal monetary delegation, avoid
these problems and in some ways o¤er a more satisfactory game-theoretic framework for
modelling reputation. Note also that in the present analysis, the central bank is entirely
passive. It merely plays the time-consistent discretionary policy – the Nash equilibrium of
the one-shot game. Rotondi (2000) introduces the possibility that the central banker, as
well as the government, establishes a reputation for low in‡ation, in a framework similar
to that of Jensen.
5As observed by Jensen it is not necessary to analyse explicitly the cases when the
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Government plays:
ft = f
a
t = ¸®y if ¼t¡1 = ¼
e
t¡1;
fat = f
a;NCD
t and ft = f
NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= ¼et¡1: (10)
Private sector plays:
¼et = 0 if ¼t¡1 = ¼
e
t¡1;
¼et = ¼
e;NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= ¼et¡1: (11)
The expressions of ¼e;NCDt and fNCDt are found by substituting f
a;NCD
t
in expressions (5) and (6) respectively. If there is a deviation from the an-
nounced optimal delegation the government minimises the loss function with
respect to ft subject to ¼et = 0 and f
a;DD
t = ¸®y. This yields the following
values:
¼DDt =
¸®y
(1 + '¤)¤
; (12)
fDDt =
'¤¸®y
1 + '¤
: (13)
According to the above strategies the condition of no deviation for the
government will be
~LPRt ¡ ~LDDt · ¯
³
~LNCDt+1 ¡ ~LPRt+1
´
; (14)
which implies that
¯ ¸ b¯D (') ´ 1 + '¤2
¤ (1 + '¤)
: (15)
Now we can compare the condition for the credibility of optimal monetary
delegation with the condition for the credibility of optimal monetary policy
when monetary policy is conducted directly by the government. With this
aim Jensen has proved the following proposition:
announcement of the government is fat 6= ¸®y as we can rule them out through a reversion
to the discretionary solution for any value of the discount factor.
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Proposition 1 For all ' > 0, b¯D (') > b¯.
PROOF:
As lim'!0 b¯D (') = b¯ and given that @ b¯D (') =@' > 0 it follows thatb¯D (') > b¯ for all ' > 0.
Thus the premise made by the standard literature on delegation that it is
the presence of reappointment costs that makes delegation to an independent
central banker more credible than the conduction of monetary policy itself
must be considered false according to Jensen’s analysis. The intuition for this
result is the following. The punishment subsequent to a deviation becomes
weaker the higher is the weight on reappointment costs. Also the gain from
deviating decreases with ' but less than the reduction in the cost deriving
from the loss of reputation. The reason is that the reduction of the gain from
deviating results from several opposing forces which mitigate the e¤ect of an
increase in '.
4 The case when all announcements are fea-
sible
Here we question Jensen’s paradoxical result that reappointment costs worsen
the credibility of optimal monetary delegation. We will show that this sur-
prising …nding is based on his not considering what happens when all an-
nouncements are feasible for maintaining a reputation for zero in‡ation. Ac-
tually, by assuming a reversion to the no-commitment solution when the
announcement fat di¤ers from the optimal one (equal to ¸®¹y), he restricts
the attention of the analysis to the case in which fat = ¸®¹y when the gov-
ernment plays its reputational strategy and fat 6= ¸®¹y when it does not. We
consider a game in which the government makes some announcement to the
central bank of the incentive scheme, and this announced scheme need not
necessarily be the optimal one. Nevertheless the actual scheme implemented
will be the optimal one, when the government plays its reputational strategy.
Consider the following strategies. In each period when it plays the rep-
utational strategy (that is, when it is following its commitment policy), the
government announces an incentive scheme fat = !, with ! > ¸®¹y. People
expect in‡ation of zero (¼et = 0). The government then actually implements
an incentive scheme with ft = ¸®¹y; i.e., the actual penalty on the central
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bank for creating in‡ation is less than the pre-announced one. It is in fact
equal to the penalty that induces the central bank to deliver zero in‡ation.
With this scheme in place, the central bank duly delivers in‡ation of the
expected rate ¼t = 0:
When the government cheats (deviates from the commitment policy), it
announces the incentive scheme as in the commitment policy, that is fat =
!, and people respond by expecting zero in‡ation (¼et = 0), but then the
government implements a di¤erent incentive scheme than the one above.
In fact it follows the discretionary policy, and implements the scheme that
minimizes its expected loss for this period, given the announced scheme and
the public’s expectations of in‡ation. The best scheme to implement satis…es
(5) above. The government therefore implements ft = !
'¤
1+'¤
and the central
bank delivers in‡ation
¼t =
¸®¹y
¤
¡ '!
1 + '¤
:
Following a period in which the government has deviated, it is punished.
In this play of the game, the government plays the discretionary policy. The
government announces an incentive scheme fa;NCDt = ¸®¹y
¤('¤+1)
'¤2+1
, people
expect in‡ation ¼et = ¸®¹y ¡ fa;NCDt '¤'¤+1 , the actual incentive scheme is
ft = f
a;NCD
t
'¤
'¤+1
, and actual in‡ation turns out as expected.
The payo¤s to the government of two of the scenarios set out above –
commitment and deviation – depend on the value of the announced incentive
!.
Looking at the payo¤s, we have for commitment,
LPRt = ¸ [® (¼t ¡ ¼et)¡ ¹y]2 + ¼2t + ' (ft ¡ !)2
= ¸¹y2 + '¸2®2¹y2 ¡ 2'¸®¹y! + '!2:
This can be written as
LPRt = ¸¹y
2 + '(¸®¹y ¡ !)2: (16)
For deviation, we have
LDDt = ¸ [® (¼t ¡ ¼et)¡ ¹y]2 + ¼2t + ' (ft ¡ !)2
=
¸2®2¹y2'+ '!2¸®2 + ¸¹y2'+ ¸¹y2 + '!2
('¸®2 + '+ 1) (¸®2 + 1)
:
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This can be written as
LDDt =
¸¹y2
¤
+
!2'
1 + '¤
: (17)
For discretion, we have:
LNCDt+1 = ¸
h
®
³
¼t+1 ¡ ¼et+1
´
¡ ¹y
i2
+ ¼2t+1 + '
³
ft+1 ¡ fa;NCDt+1
´2
=
(¸®2 + 1) ¹y2¸ ('¸®2 + '+ 1)
'¸2®4 + 2'¸®2 + '+ 1
;
and this can be written as
LNCDt+1 =
¹y2¸ ('¤+ 1)¤
'¤2 + 1
: (18)
How do these payo¤s change as ! is varied? Jensen’s model of delegation
with commitment uses ! = ¸®¹y: In order for the proposed solution to be
sustainable with one-period punishment by reversion to discretion, we need
to have
(LPRt ¡ LDDt ) + ¯(LPRt+1 ¡ LNCDt+1 ) · 0: (19)
At ! = ¸®¹y, the losses for commitment (LPRt or L
PR
t+1) are at a minimum
and they equal ¸¹y2: They are quadratic in !, and increase for smaller or
larger !. The loss for deviation (when ! = ¸®¹y) are
LDDt =
¸¹y2
¤
+
(¸®¹y)2'
1 + '¤
=
¸¹y2(1 + '¤2)
¤(1 + '¤)
;
and this is less than the loss for commitment. But it important to note is
that the loss under deviation is increasing in ! at this value of !, while the
loss under discretion is locally constant. It starts to rise as ! increases, but
only very slowly at …rst. Thus as ! is increased above Jensen’s value of ¸®¹y,
the temptation to cheat, which is the gap between the two
³
LPRt ¡ LDDt
´
,
gets less. The punishment for cheating,
³
LNCDt+1 ¡ LPRt+1
´
, also gets less as
the value of ! is increased, but it does so slowly at …rst because LNCDt+1 is
independent of ! and LPRt+1 is locally constant. So increasing the value of
! above ¸®y by a little bit is likely to make the commitment outcome easier
to sustain.
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In other words, an increase in the strength of !, the announced anti-
in‡ation incentive given to the central bank, has a …rst order e¤ect on the
loss associated with the cheating scenario, but only a second order e¤ect on
the losses of the reputation solution, and no e¤ect on the loss that is got in
the punishment phase. There is a …rst order e¤ect on the temptation to
cheat, but only a second order e¤ect on the punishment for cheating. Figure
1 plots the losses associated with the commitment outcome, deviation, and
punishment, for di¤erent values of !.
Interestingly, the losses under reputation and under cheating actually be-
come equal at one value of !. The curves representing the two loss functions
become tangent at that point. At all other points the losses under cheat-
ing are less than the losses under reputation. If the loss under deviation
(equation 17) is set equal to the loss under reputation (equation 18) then
one obtains
¸¹y2
¤
+
!2'
1 + '¤
= ¸¹y2 + '(¸®¹y ¡ !)2:
The only value of ! that solves this equation is
! =
(1 + ¤')¸®¹y
¤'
;
and thus the two functions are equal for this value of !. The slopes of the
functions LDDt and L
PR
t are
2!'
1+'¤
and ¡2'(¸®¹y ¡ !) respectively. Equating
them gives the same value of ! as above. So the two functions are tangents
to each other at this point. At this point, the losses are
LDDt = L
PR
t = ¸¹y
2 + '(¸®¹y ¡ (1 + ¤')¸®¹y
¤'
)2
= ¸¹y2 ¡ '(¸®¹y
¤'
)2
= ¸¹y2
Ã
¤2'+ ¤¡ 1
¤2'
!
:
Compared with the loss under discretion (which is LNCDt+1 =
¹y2¸('¤+1)¤
'¤2+1
) it
is evident that the loss under discretion is lower than the loss under either
reputation or deviation, for this value of !. So evidently the value of ! for
which the critical value of the discount factor is minimized is lower than this
one.
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It is possible to …nd the value of the announcement ! for which the critical
value of ¯ needed to sustain the reputational solution is at a minimum. This
is done in the following paragraphs.
When the government is considering whether or not to deviate from the
reputation solution, the criterion for not deviating is given by equation (19)
above, in which LPRt the reputational loss is given by (16), the loss under
deviation LDDt is given by (17) and the loss under the discretionary policy
LNCDt+1 is given by (18). The parameter ¤ is de…ned as ¤ ´ 1 + ¸®2. Thus
the critical value of ¯ satis…es
¯ =
LPRt ¡ LDDt
LNCDt+1 ¡ LPRt+1
:
The numerator of this expression can be written as
LPRt ¡ LDDt = ¸¹y2 + '(¸®¹y ¡ !)2 ¡
¸¹y2
¤
¡ !
2'
1 + '¤
;
which with a little manipulation becomes
LPRt ¡ LDDt =
1
¤(1 + '¤)
[¸®¹y(1 + '¤)¡ !'¤]2
=
'2¤
(1 + '¤)
"
¸®¹y
Ã
1 + '¤
'¤
!
¡ !
#2
=
'2¤
(1 + '¤)
"
¸®¹y
'¤
+ ¸®¹y ¡ !
#2
;
while the denominator gives
LNCDt+1 ¡ LPRt+1 = ¹y2¸
Ã
¤ + '¤2
1 + '¤2
!
¡ ¸¹y2 ¡ '(¸®¹y ¡ !)2;
which with some manipulation becomes
LNCDt+1 ¡ LPRt+1 =
¹y2¸2®2
1 + '¤2
¡ '(¸®¹y ¡ !)2
= '
"
¹y2¸2®2
'(1 + '¤2)
¡ (¸®¹y ¡ !)2
#
= '
24 ¹y¸®q
'(1 + '¤2)
+ (¸®¹y ¡ !)
3524 ¹y¸®q
'(1 + '¤2)
¡ (¸®¹y ¡ !)
35 :
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Now all this can be put back together. The expression for the critical ¯ can
be written as
¯ =
LPRt ¡ LDDt
LNCDt+1 ¡ LPRt+1
(20)
=
'¤
(1 + '¤)
[A¡ !0]2
[B ¡ !0] [B + !0] ;
in which !0 ´ ! ¡ ¸®¹y, A ´ ¸®¹y
'¤
, B ´ ¸®¹yp
'(1+'¤2)
:
We want to choose ! to minimize the critical value. We are looking at
values of !0 that lie in the range (0; B). That is equivalent to looking at
values of ! that are at least as great as in the Jensen solution and which
go up to the value at which the punishment for cheating becomes zero, i.e.,
where the loss due to discretion equals the loss under reputation. At the
mimimum critical value,
¡ 2
A¡ !0 +
1
B ¡ !0 ¡
1
B + !0
= 0:
Multiplying through by (A¡ !0)(B ¡ !0)(B + !0) and tidying up gives
!0 = B2=A;
and the value of the function at the minimum point is
b¯D¤ = min
!02(0;B)
"
LPRt ¡ LDDt
LNCDt+1 ¡ LPRt+1
#
=
'¤
(1 + '¤)
h
A¡ B2
A
i2h
B ¡ B2
A
i h
B + B
2
A
i
=
'¤
(1 + '¤)
A2 ¡B2
B2
=
'¤
(1 + '¤)
Ã
¸2®2¹y2
'2¤2
¡ ¸
2®2¹y2
'(1 + '¤2)
!
'(1 + '¤2)
¸2®2¹y2
=
1
¤(1 + '¤)
:
Since this value is less than 1=¤ this proves that the critical ¯ under delega-
tion with any announcement is less than under simple discretion.
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The result is illustrated in Figure 2, in which the function (20) is plot-
ted against !0. It shows that at !0 = 0, the critical value of the discount
factor equals b¯D(> 1=¤) the value obtained by Jensen. As !0 increases,
the critical value of ¯ falls until it reaches a minimum, at !0 = B2=A, when
the critical value is b¯D¤ as de…ned above. For values of the incentive !0
greater than B2=A the value of the critical discount factor rises again, and
approaches in…nity as !0 approaches B. A government with any given value
of the discount factor would wish to employ the lowest value of the an-
nounced incentive scheme !0 consistent with sutaining zero in‡ation in the
reputational equilibrium. The left hand branch of the relationship between
!0 ( 2 (0; B)) and ¯ is therefore the relevant one. Delegation with an an-
nounced incentive scheme and reappointment costs therefore permits some
types of government, those types whose discount factor ¯ lies between 1=¤
and b¯D¤(= 1
¤(1+'¤)
< 1=¤), who would not have been able to sustain zero
in‡ation in the absence of delegation with reappointment costs, to sustain
zero in‡ation in the reputational equilibrium.
Therefore this argument has shown that if the government is allowed to
make any announcement of ! then it is possible to have zero in‡ation using
delegation with a lower discount factor than is needed to sustain zero in‡ation
with no delegation of policy.
It may be argued that this result is merely a curiosity, because it involves
the government in making an announcement about ! that is not honoured.
The actual value of the incentive that is used is always less than the an-
nounced one.6 This behaviour is expected, and the private sector expects
and gets zero in‡ation – so they are happy. Arguably this scenario does not
correspond with the behaviour any government and central bank in practice.
A counter-argument to such a position is that the scenario presented
above is just as realistic as Svensson’s (1997) idea that optimal in‡ation and
output stabilization can be achieved by giving a central bank a negative
in‡ation target – knowing all the while that discretionary behaviour by the
central bank will lead to its generating zero in‡ation on average.
The key point that we would stress here is the logical one that Jensen’s
result is based on an implicit assumption that may be too strong. If this
assumption is relaxed, then his result disappears, and delegation with reap-
pointment costs does indeed solve the time-inconsistency problem It does
6But notice that the equilibrium the static one-shot game shares this feature. The
actual value of the incentive that is used there is always less than the announced one.
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not merely relocate it.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that Jensen’s result, to the e¤ect that intro-
ducing costs of re-appointing a central banker does not make it any easier
to sustain a zero-in‡ation outcome, is based on his making the assumption
that the government must announce the same incentive scheme as the one
that it actually uses in practice in the reputational play of the game. If this
assumption is relaxed, then the result disappears also: re-appoinmtent costs
may make it easier to sustain the zero-in‡ation outcome. The reason is that
the announcement of the incentive scheme at the start of the period a¤ects
the incentives of the government later in the period when it puts in place the
actual incentive scheme. By announcing a more vigorous scheme at the start
of the period, the government has less incentive to deviate from the reputa-
tional zero-in‡ation outcome. However, the proposed solution does have the
unattractive feature that the announced incentive di¤ers from the actually
implemented one. From certain perspectives this may seem an odd model
of reputational behaviour. However is perhaps a widespread observation in
politics, that politicians make promises, generally in a e¤ort to get votes, by
which they bind themselves to carrying though certain policies. There is
likely to be slippage from these commitments when the time comes to deliver
on them. Voters know and expect this, but nevertheless there are political
costs to be paid by politicians who appear to have made no e¤ort to honour
their pledges, and whose actual policies deviate grossly from the announced
ones. Therefore we would argue that our solution in this paper contains
important elements of descriptive realism.
The key point that has been made here is that delegating monetary policy
to an independent central banker, with an announced or promised incentive
scheme (or equivalently, contract for the central banker) that is costly to
change, can, under circumstances which are not extreme, be more credible
than the conduct of monetary policy without delegation. This results from
reappointment costs.
But there are important distinctions to be made between the analysis
undertaken here and the standard theory of monetary delegation, based on
the static one-shot game. First we have shown that the delegation solution
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for time-inconsistency can be conducive to reputation-building for the gov-
ernment and hence is not merely an alternative to the reputational solution,
as is usually claimed in the standard theory, but adds something to it.
Moreover, in much of the literature on delegation of monetary policy,
incentive schemes or policy targets are introduced in order to constrain the
behaviour of the central banker according to the objectives of the government.
The view of the delegation process that emerges from the analysis in this
paper is rather di¤erent, as one of the main e¤ects of the reappointment
costs is, in certain circumstances, to enhance a government’s reputation for
low in‡ation. Because delegation is done long in advance (in advance, that
is, of in‡ation expectations being formed, or shocks – not modelled here –
hitting the system) the government is led to announce an incentive scheme
for the central bank that has good long-term properties. As subsequent
changes to the incentive scheme are costly, the announcements constrain
the behaviour of the government, and limit its interference, as it were, in the
central bank’s policy making. Hence we agree with McCallum’s (1997, p.109)
observation that “....the main e¤ect of such arrangements [as those of New
Zealand’s] is not principally to constrain the central bank to act in accordance
with the government’s objectives, but rather to constrain the government by
increasing the di¢culty of its bringing pressure to in‡ate upon the central
bank.... Arrangements such as those of New Zealand’s, therefore, give the
central banks an increased opportunity to behave in a rule-like, committed
fashion”.
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Figure 1 –  Losses associated with the pre-commitment, deviation and punishment outcomes as a
function of the announcement of the government
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Figure 2 – The set of feasible announcements and the optimal announcement of the government
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